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Introduction 
Sustainable development is a concept which has achieved enormous popularity in 
both the academie and the political world. Evaluation of development projects 
increasingly focusses on the issue of sustainability. Theoretical articles are proliferat-
ing too, and are often concerned with clarifying the idea of sustainable development 
(See for instance Lélé (1991)). Despite these efforts, the meaning of sustainable 
development remains not very well operationalised. It is not clear how we should 
decide whether a given economie system is sustainable or unsustainable. Nor is it 
sufficiently clear how sustainable development should translate into cost-benefit 
analysis.2 Therefore, at this moment economics has little to offer as a guidance for 
policy makers. 
At a conceptual level, the problem seems to originate in the absence of 
microeconomic considerations in the sustainable development discussion. First, we 
must seek a criterion for intergenerational justice, and this should be translated into 
the microeconomic framework. Conceptually, present actions influence welfare of 
future generations by altering the production possibility curve (per capita)3, and by 
changing the stocks of natural resources and the amount of amenities derived 
thereof.4 These changes in stocks and the production possibility curve should be 
1
 The paper has benefitted from comments and suggestions of H. Kox, H. Linnemann, M. 
Peerdeman, and H. de Vries. 
2
 This question is considered in considerable detail in Pearce et al. [1990], which is in our opinion 
the most conceptually clear reference till now. However, we disagree with the importance they attach 
to the constancy of natural capital. 
3
 A typical example is the warming of the earth's atmosphere, caused by the emission of 
greenhouse gases. Among other consequences, this affects the production possibility curve in altering 
the amounts of crops the world agricultural system is able to produce: Some yields falling, some 
yields rising. 
4
 This include various aspects, which can be illustrated with the example of tropical forests. 
Society derives value from the existence of tropical forests in the form of its role in the world 
ecosystem (binding of C02, production of 02 , hydrological balances, etc), from its beauty, from its 
store of yet undiscovered treasures, from the options for future use, and from the noncommitment to 
irreversible change, in a world with many uncertainties. 
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combined with social preference curves5, to see how present action affect future 
generations. Sustainable development is equated with non declining welfare. In titós 
article, we use this framework to find a set of criteria which enables us to teil 
whether a given system is sustainable. Sustainable development so defined becomes 
a concrete concept, instead of some expression of some vague concern for future 
generations. The increased clarity of the concept enables us to translate it into a 
cost-benefit analysis framework. We will be able to lay down some concrete criteria 
for selecting development projects, in order to achieve sustainable development. 
This article is set up as follows. In section one, we briefly discuss the present 
definitions of sustainable development. Our definition of sustainability is in the same 
spirit as the one by Pearce et al. (1990), concentrating on ever increasing per capita 
welfare. In section two, we discuss the frequently mentioned constant capital rule, as 
a necessary condition for achieving sustainable development. In section three, we 
concentrate on the use of real Green income per capita in evaluating sustainability. 
In section four, we lay down rules for cost-benefit analysis with a sustainability 
constraint. 
I Sustainable Development: Definition. 
Pearce et al. (1990b) list some 25 different definitions of sustainable development. 
This illustrates both the widespread use of the concept and the vagueness of it. Of 
course it is not possible to evaluate all of these definitions; we concentrate on the 
most important ones, identifying the most important issues involved. 
The most famous definition of sustainable development is by the Brundtland commission:6 
5
 The social preference curve may be viewed as an aggregate of individual cardinal utility curves. 
Weights may be included to be able to evaluate distribution issues, but these weights should then be 
held constant. In what follows, we assume that all weights are equal. Arguments in the social 
preference curve are not only services and products which may be obtained in the market, but also the 
products and services yielded to us by nature, such as the beauty of tropical forests, its value as store 
of yet undiscovered treasures, etc, mentioned above. All quantities in the social preference curve 
should be per capita. 
6
 Other definitions of sustainable development are due to among others Frankel [1976], Pinchot, 
as cited in O'Riordan [1988], Turner [1988]. Of these, the definition of Turner is most interesting, 
contrasting as he does between two concepts: 
1) Sustainable Growth Mode: "In the sustainable growth mode, conservation would be one 
of several goals within an overall materials policy which 
would include waste recycling options and waste reduction 
strategies." 
2) Sustainable Development Mode: "The sustainable development mode represents some more 
radical departures. Conservation and/or preservation become 
the sole basis for defining a criterion with which to judge 
policy." (Turner [1988] p. 6-8) 
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"Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs." (WCED (1987) p. 43) 
The power of this definition is the clear political intention to consider the conse-
quences of our activities to future generations. As such, it has considerable merit. 
As a guidance for policymakers it has major drawbacks, in that it leaves to be 
determined what the "needs" of the future generations are, and, more important, 
what is meant by "compromising". 
"Needs" are not only the needs satisfied by market processes, but also needs 
satisfïed without market transactions, such as the "need" for beautiful landscapes, for 
conservation of rare species of flora and fauna, etc. In principle the needs of the 
present generation can be known; the needs of the future generation are unknown, 
however, which makes it very difficult to teil that we do or do not compromise their 
ability to meet their own needs. To be able to do this, we need to make some 
assumption about the needs of future generations, but the Brundtland definition does 
not teil us which. 
"Compromising" is an even more difficult notion. Consider, for instance, the use of 
some depletable, non-renewable resource, e.g. crude oil. Evidently, this reduces the 
possibilities of future generations, because they will be left with less crude oil for 
their own use. However, it can be imagined that, though we leave future generations 
with a smaller stock of non-renewable resources, we can more then compensate 
them through building a bigger stock of man-made capital. Again, the Brundtland 
definition does not yield any insights in how much bigger the stock of man-made 
capital should be, in order to compensate for a smaller stock of natural resources. 
Furthermore, no hard criteria are stated about the tradeoff between present and 
future generations. Of course the present generation can reduce its current consump-
tion as much as it wants to yield more to the future, so as not to "compromise" the 
ability of the future generations to meet their own needs, but how far should it go? 
It is clear that we need some criteria for intergenerational justice, as offered in the 
following definition: 
"We take development to be a vector of desirable social objectives; that is, 
it is a list of attributes which society seeks to achieve or maximize. The 
elements of this vector might include: 
- Increases in real income per capita; 
- Improvements in healths and natural status; 
- Educational achievements; 
- Access to resources; 
- A fairer distribution of incomes; 
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- Increases in basic freedoms. 
Correlation between these elements, or an agreed system of weights to be 
applied to them, might permit development to be represented by a single 
'proxy' indicator, but this is not an issue pursued here. Sustainable develop-
ment is then a situation in which the development vector D does not 
decrease over time." (Pearce et al. (1990) p.3, italics in original) 
In this definition, sustainable development is the situation in which future gener-
ations are at least as well of as we are, and so defines the threshold of the tradeoff 
between present and future generations. In this way it incorporates the idea of an 
unsustainable use pattern as a use pattern unable to continue indefinitely in the same 
way, the "break" being the decline in welfare.7 
A few comments are in order. First, it need be understood that two types of vectors 
have to be distinguished in the definition above: The first being the vector of the 
elements which should increase to be able to talk about development, the second 
being the vector D, of the actual values of these elements. Second, it is unfortunate 
to specify a development vector, because only in restricted cases is the vector D 
strictly increasing over time: Only if all elements increase in value. Generally, some 
elements of the vector D will increase in value and some will decline. In order to 
evaluate whether or not development has taken place, reduction to one proxy as 
mentioned above is necessary, as we will do in the following section. 
Pearce et al. further distinguish between strong and weak sustainabiiity. Strong 
sustainabiiity requires that the development vector D is nondecreasing at all points of 
time, while weak sustainabiiity requires that the trend of the development vector D 
is nonnegative over time. (With the further constraint that the development vector D, 
when declining, may not decline for too long.) The relevant time horizon over which 
weak or strong sustainabiiity is to be evaluated is essentially undetermined, but must 
be taken sufficiently long. 
The definition of sustainable development above offers some criteria for the tradeoff 
between present and future generations. These criteria may seem quite arbitrary, but 
actually have some quite strong underpinning: 
First, consider the ratchet effect. Simplified, this means that individuals are not 
willing to accept a level of consumption lower then they had before. Aggregating 
this for society, and abstracting from distribution problems, we have something like 
7
 Essentially the same idea is found in Idachaba, in the context of agricultural development: 
"Sustainabiiity in agricultural development therefore refers to the ability of agricultural 
systems to keep production and distribution continuously without falling." (Idachaba [1987] 
p. 18) 
The connection with the Hicksian income concept (Hicks [1946] p. 172) is quite clear. 
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society unwilling to accept a welfare level lower than society was used to before. 
Furthermore, it is possible to justify the requirement that future generations should 
be at least as well off as the present generation, using the superfairness criterion.8 
The superfairness criterion holds that a just distribution exists when each individual 
prefers its own bundie of goods to that of any other individual in society. In 
intergenerational context, we could require that each generation should prefer its 
own possibilities to that of any other. However, because an earlier generation can 
affect generations to come, while future generations cannot affect present gener-
ations, applying the superfairness criteria would require that we guarantee future 
generations at least the same welfare level as our generation.9 
The definition of Pearce et al. thus provides a satisfactory interpretation of the 
"compromising" in the Brundtland definition. It is completely in line with the idea of 
sustainability as something which goes on, without a change in some essential 
element; in sustainable development it is the non-decrease in welfare which goes on 
forever. However, the definition leaves the problem how to evaluate the welfare 
levels of future generations. We would like to suggest that welfare levels of future 
generation are evaluated using present preferences. 
The main idea behind using present preferences is that we don't know how prefer-
ences will change. Consider what would happen if we did not treat preferences as 
constant: Preferences could change in such a way that a change in the per capita10 
social production possibility curve, which with constant preferences would yield a 
lower utility level, now yields a higher utility level, "saving" sustainability; or social 
preferences could change in such a way that the utility associated with a fixed bundie 
of goods, services, and natural stocks (per capita) would decline, thus causing the 
sustainability criterion to be violated. Obviously, as production possibilities and 
stocks etc. per capita would remain constant, the sustainability criterion can not be 
violated, but allowing for changing preferences, it can be violated. 
Now, consider what would happen if we evaluated welfare using constant social 
preferences. If the production possibility curve changes in such a way that the 
resulting utility level under unchanging preferences would be lower than before, the 
8
 See Baumol [1987] for a broad treatment of superfairness. 
9
 More specifically, the average individual in future generations should be at least as well off as 
the average individual in our generation, which justifies the use of per capita measures, like social 
preference curves with per capita quantities, and per capita production possibility curves in section 
III. 
10
 As we want to guarantee the "average" individual in future generations at least the same 
welfare level as the average individual in the current generations, we need a welfare criterion which 
refers to the average individual: So the arguments in the social preference curve and the social 
production possibility curve are per capita quantities throughout the rest of this paper. 
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system is unsustainable, because a change in preferences11 (a "break") must occur 
in order to yield the future generation a utility level equal or higher than ours. If the 
future generation would have a higher utility level than ours, having the same set of 
preferences, no "break" is required, hence no violation of sustainability has 
occurred. Thus we would suggest the following definition of sustainable develop-
ment: 
Sustainable development is the situation in which the vector of the stock of 
natura! resources, inventories, and the production possibility curve change 
in such a way, that the resulting maximum social utility is nondecreasing 
over time, evaluated using constant social preferences. All quantities are 
expressed in per capita terms. 
This definition embodies the definition of sustainable development as a progress in 
welfare with the restriction that a later decline in welfare is avoidable, without 
forcing a change in the preferences of society; so it embodies the idea of a system, 
capable of continuous development. 
Note that we do not allow for changes in welfare because of distributional effects; 
first because changes in stocks of natural resources, inventories and the production 
possibility curve are not connected with redistribution policies; second because we 
do not want to allow for the possibility that the sustainable development requirement 
is "saved" by favourable redistribution effects, for instance when without these 
effects environmental costs would be higher than all benefits. We feel that the 
attainment of a more equitable distribution of welfare, however justified, should not 
be included in sustainable development, but should be a separate goal. 
Furthermore, note the specifics of the social preference curve we are using: The 
social preferences are obtained by aggregating individual preferences, with equal 
weights. In evaluating future welfare, we use exactly these social preferences. The 
arguments in the social preferences are per capita quantities, as are the quantities in 
the production possibility curve. 
11
 In principle it is possible to guide preferences by education, for instance. In some cases, 
changing people's behaviour is justified, as in the Dutch campaigns to save on the use of energy. In 
general, however, we feel that preferences of individuals should not be forced in any particular 
direction just to guarantee post-hoc a nondecrease in welfare; rather, influencing people's preferences 
must be based on the merits of the supposed change itself. 
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II Non-decrease of (natural) capital as a necessarv condition for sustainable 
development? 
Frequently the suggestion is made that the amount of natural capital should be at 
least constant as a necessary condition for sustainable development.12 We deal with 
the various forms of constant capital criteria, because they are the basis for the Cost-
Benefit Analysis in Perace et. al. (1990). This idea is stated in the Brundtland 
report: 
" If needs are to be met on a sustainable basis the Earth's natural resource 
base must be conserved and enhanced." 
(WCED (1987), p. 57) 
The idea is also accepted by Pearce et al. (1990). They justify the conservation of 
the existing amount of natural capital by referring to the irreversibility of changes in 
natural capital, as well as the uncertainty concerning the life support and other 
functions of natural capital. Further they state that natural capital provides for some 
intragenerational equity13, and use prospect theory to argue that from present 
viewpoint the existing stock of natural capital might be optimal. The problem of 
valuing the natural capital is discussed in some detail, rejecting the use of constant 
physical natural capital (which is meaningless in case of nonrenewables) and the 
constancy of the price of natural capital, and instead opt for a combination of the 
economie value of the stock of natural capital, with some minimum levels of 
physical stock, with serious warnings considering the difficulty in measuring all the 
values derived from natural stock. 
Some comments might be in order. First we would like to emphasize that the 
relevant consideration should be the amount of natural capital per capita, in order to 
capture the idea of leaving the next generation at least as well off. Second, holding 
natural capital constant can imply leaving future generations worse off, if under this 
constraint no projects with positive present value (obtained from valuing all types of 
benefits, including amenities etc.) can be undertaken. Third, we don't think it will 
be possible to keep the stock of natural capital constant, both in per capita and 
absolute terms. Consider the depletion of fossil fuels. The destruction of natural 
capital is very high (if we take world trade per year as an estimate of destruction of 
natural capital per year, destruction by depletion of crude oil reserves alone would 
12
 In Van den Bergh [1991] sustainable development is defïned as development, (...) "maintaining 
the natural foundation of economie processes" (Van den Bergh [1991] p. 8). In this case, sustainable 
refers to sustainability of the environment, and therefore requires at least constant natural capital. In 
this article, we prefer to focus on the sustainability of development, which in general allows for 
higher welfare levels. 
13
 Natural capital provides the poor in developing countries with several valuable resources, like 
meat from wild animals, fïsh, medicines, fïre wood, building material etc. 
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amount to $134 billion per year14), and it is not conceivable to think of reforesta-
tion and other investments in natural capital compensating for the loss of natural 
capital by consumption of fossil fuels. This suggests that we should consider the 
possibility of substituting natural capital and man-made capital. So we have to think 
about the constancy of capital as a necessary condition for sustainable development. 
This point of view is advanced by Repetto15: 
"Sustainable development as a goal rejects policies and practices that 
support present living standards by depleting the productive base, including 
natural resources, and that leaves future generations with poorer prospects 
and greater risks than our own." (Repetto (1986) p. 15) 
Let's consider how this would apply to our definition of sustainable development. 
The production possibility curve can change because of technical change, changes in 
stocks of natural capital, changes in stocks of man-made capital, learning effects and 
changes in human capital. Furthermore, Iets assume that we can put a capital value 
on the amenity-producing function of environment (environmental amenities capital 
for short). Non-decrease in capital per capita is a sufficiënt condition for guaran-
teeing individuals in future generations at least our level of welfare if all the above 
mentioned causes for changes in the production possibility curve are considered as 
changes in capital, and changes in the environmental amenities capital are added. 
Now the question arises how we would value some non-marketable capital compo-
nent, for instance the changes in stocks of natural capital, say pollution of water. 
Probably we would measure future benefits arising from changes in stocks of natural 
capital, and discount these into a net present value which we could name the 
"change in stocks of natural capital". This procedure leaves us with some intriguing 
questions, like: 
- Should all components of capital have the same discount rate? 
- Which discount rate should be used? 
Even if we are able to give satisfactory answers to these questions, we don't feel 
that we gain by prescribing constancy of per capita capital as a necessary condition 
for sustainable development: We are left with the necessity to estimate the future 
production possibility curve anyway, to be able to determine the benefits of changes 
in components of the total capital stock. It is possible to conceive of some compo-
nent of capital as not directly yielding benefits. Though capital may increase, 
benefits may decline for a sufficiently long period to feel that sustainable develop-
14
 UNCTAD International Trade Statistic Yearbook 1988 
15
 It is also considered by Pearce et al., but rejected, probably out of fear that the value of natural 
capital, which is often non-marketable value, will be underestimated. (Pearce et al. (1990), p. 18-19) 
8 
ment nas been violated.16 We strongly feel that the constancy of all capital per 
capita prescription yields us nothing on a conceptual level, at best will confound the 
issue of sustainable development with valuation problems, and at worst, depending 
on concrete patterns of benefits and costs, will be just wrong. 
Hl Sustainable development and Green Income 
It would be very helpful if some measure existed which would enable us to see if 
progress is made along the line of sustainable development. Let's assume that for 
each year we have a set of prices and quantities of goods and services traded in the 
market. Further, assume that each year the nonmarketable environmental benefits 
are valued, e.g. in applying Pigovian taxes, and assume that all relevant functions 
can be valued exactly.17 We would then be able to calculate a Green Income per 
capita, as follows: 
G I = ?(q iPi) (1) 
in which i is a index over all products and services delivered by both market 
processes and non-market processes. Clearly all amenities derived from environment 
fall in this latter category. The qj are the quantities per capita of each of those 
services, amenities and products, and the p; are the prices, obtained from the 
markets or established by non-market techniques (in the case of absence of markets), 
in both cases equal to the marginal value of i. Observe that we do not assume 
perfect markets; prices will still reflect marginal values even in cases of imperfect 
competition. The only really strong assumption here is that we assume knowledge of 
all products traded, so that in the budget application plan all relevant goods and 
services etc. are valued. 
Let's know consider Green Income per capita and sustainability. Sustainability, as 
defined above, requires the evaluation of a constant set of social preferences. We 
assume that utility depends on the quantities per capita of each of the above men-
tioned services, products and amenities: 
U, = f0(qi> t , q2,t, . . . ,q»,t) (2) 
16
 This depends evidently on which concept of sustainable development we want to apply. Using 
strong sustainable development, each decline in the benefits may be seen as violation of the 
sustainable development criterion; in the weak form we would have to define some time period, over 
which the non-decrease in benefits should be estimated. This may not be longer than a lifetime, in 
order not to violate the idea of leaving future generation as least as well of as we are, so that it is 
conceivable that even "very weak" sustainable development will be violated, even though the "all 
capital constant" criterion has been satisfied. 
17
 This would require knowing the preferences of all individuals, obtaining willingness to be 
compensated data. On the problem of establishing preferences, see Knetsch and Sinden [1984], 
Knetsch [1988], Nash and Bowers [1988], and Pearce and Markandya [1989]. 
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in which n is the number of different services, products and amenities available, f0 is 
a constant function of the amount of each service etc. per capita consumed, and q^  
the quantity per capita of good, service or amenity i supplied in period t. The 
change in utility from period t to period t+1 is given by 
AUt = Ut+1 - U, = f0 (qi,,+i, q2,t+i, ••-, «WO - fo fou» «h.» — > <L,d (3) 
The Taylor expansion of AUt is given by 
AUt = f l/k! (*Dk ( f ^ , q ^ .... q j ) ) (4) 
in which *Dk (f0(qi>t> q2,t, • ••> «kt))) is a shorthand for the operator 
(Aq1>t -d/dq, + Aq2il d/dq2 + Aq„>t d/dqj* (f0(qlit, q2)t, ..., q j ) (5) 
For small changes, we may truncate the Taylor series in good approximation after 
the first term. We then obtain the following approximation: 
AUt « (Aq1>t 3/aq, + Aq2>t d/dq2 + Aq„,t d/dqj (f0(qM, q2,t, ..., qj) (6) 
We know from Standard microeconomic theory that prices are directly proportional 
to the partial derivatives of the utility function. Substituting (c pit) for 8/8% (f0(qi,t, 
<h,u •••> Qn,t))> in which c is the (positive) constant of proportionality, we obtain: 
AUt - f c (pi>t Aqi;t) (7) 
This result has some very interesting implications. First, consider Green Income 
under full use of potential production capacity.18 In this case, strong sustainability 
requires that per capita welfare is nondecreasing, and therefore, that AUt is nonnega-
tive. From the result above we can derive that AUt will be above zero when the 
change in Green Income, valued at the old prices, is above zero.19 This gives a 
yardstick to see, looking back, whether given changes in the economy have been 
fulfilling the sustainable development requirements20: 
18
 This is the production capacity, taking account of the sustainability constraint: It is conceivable 
that full use of all production capacity can not be made to agree with the sustainability constraint. 
19
 More accurately, this relationship holds in good approximation. The approximation is better 
when changes are small; typically we would compare yearly data, in which case the approximation 
would hold quite well. 
20
 It should be emphasized that this is a strictly historical view, which does not predict anything 
about future developments. So its use is restricted to those cases in which a certain policy, aimed to 
be sustainable, should be evaluated for its results over a given period. It is then only possible to state 
positively that sustainable development has not been achieved 
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Sustainable development has not been achieved when the Green income 
measured at the prices of a year before is lower than the Green income of 
the year before, assuming full use of potential production capacity at both 
years.21 
A key feature is that last year's prices are used in the evaluation. Second, let's 
assume we want to evaluate a not too bulky project. We can argue that the project is 
in line with sustainable development if it causes a positive change in utility from 
year to year, if the project would be added to a sustainable economy: 
AUt > 0 ; all t (8) 
We can approximate the effect of this project according to (7), using prices in the 
base period. Changes in quantities will be directly due to changes in the economy as 
a whole and to the project. Because the project is small, we can assume that second 
order effects of the changes in the economy outside the project are negligible. We 
then obtain the important result, that a project is in line with sustainable develop-
ment when the net benefits of the project, valued as changes in quantities due to the 
project times prices in the period before the project started are increasing for each 
period (strong sustainability): 
AUt « £ c (Pi,0 Aqi>t) > 0 ; all t (9) 
So a project could be started when the Green Project Income, valued at constant 
prices from the base period, is ever increasing. For big projects this procedure fails, 
however, because the Aq; are too large for (7) to be a good approximation. For 
evaluating very big projects we must know the preference function.which is global, 
instead of the first partial derivatives in the starting period for small projects, which 
is strictly local. 
Observe that these results are only valid when we start from a sustainable economy. 
In those cases that the starting point is not a sustainable one, we are not able to use 
the prices in the base period, because the relative prices may differ too much from 
those in a sustainable economy. We can in principle apply the same rules, however, 
if we are able to calculate the relative prices in a sustainable starting point, and use 
this set of prices. 
Both these results show that sustainable development issues can be attacked with 
conventional methods, suggesting the possibility of using cost-benefit analysis. 
21
 In practice, this requirement will never be fulfilled, but we may be able to correct Green 
Income for changes in capacity use. 
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IV Sustainable Development Projects and Cost-Benefit Analvsis 
We now want to translate our definition of sustainable development into rules for 
cost-benefit analysis.22 First, how do we measure costs and benefits? The analysis 
of section III suggests that the choice is easy if we are evaluating a small project. In 
that case, we can evaluate costs and benefits as changes in quantities, times prices in 
the base period, which are assumed to equal marginal value. In all other cases, we 
are left with a much more difficult task, which is most difficult in those cases that 
the project is big, long-lived and the starting point is not sustainable. (We must than 
first calculate prices (marginal values) for each period for the closest sustainable 
development path, and must evaluate the changes in quantities at those changing 
prices. In order to do this, we would have to know the social preference curve, 
which is a formidable task.) 
Next, what's the rationale behind discounting?23 Now let's suppose that we con-
sider starting a project, which yields us immediate net benefits, amounting to 110$. 
However, two years later we have to pay a net cost of $121. All costs and benefits 
in other years are zero. The appropriate rate of discount is 10% per year. Tradi-
tionally, our analysis proceeds by discounting the future and summing, yielding the 
present value: 
PV = 110- 121(1/1.1)2 = 10 
We start the project, because the net present value is above zero. We can interpret 
this as meaning that we could deposit the benefits of the project $110, in a bank, 
yielding 10% per year, and use the proceeds to pay the costs of $121 two year later, 
holding in excess $12.10. So we are able to say that the project is such, that we can 
be as well off in the present period with the project as without, and that we will be 
better off in the period two years later because of the project. Clearly, this applies in 
case of monetary benefits of $110. However, now assume that the benefits are 
nonmonetary, let's say a temporal beautiful view. As it is impossible to bring this to 
the bank, the question may arise whether we are allowed to apply a discount rate to 
these benefits. We argue that this procedure is allowed, based on the fiingibility of 
benefits: it doesn't matter where benefits come from. We can imagine that the 
project is started, that we reduce monetary benefits from another project by $110, 
use the nonmonetary benefits of $110 of the project under consideration as compen-
sation, and use the monetary benefits to bring it to a bank. We'11 refer to this type 
of investment as a Zero Present Value Project. The analysis is then completely the 
same as before. Proceeding in this way, we can see that each project with a present 
22
 For Clarity, in this part it is assumed that population is constant. For short term projects, the 
increase in population is not very significant. For long term projects, the increase in population is a 
factor which should be taken count off; this is left to the reader as an exercise. 
23
 The use of a discount rate may be justified by referring to the marginal productivity of capital 
or to the time preference of consumption. For a neat discussion, see Pearce et al. [1990] 
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value above zero can generate net benefits for some later time period, without 
negatively affecting the present period. Projects with a net present value above zero 
can therefore be made to agree with the requirement of nondecreasing per capita 
welfare, in line with the sustainable development constraint. Thus we have the 
following important statements: 
1) Provided that we value all the functions of environmental resources correct-
&, a positive present value of a project means that the project can be imple-
mented under such conditions that the sustainable development condition is 
not violated. 
That is, if we start from a sustainable development point, then the project can be 
implemented in such a way as to not violate the sustainable development constraint. 
Alternatively, if we start from zero and only implement projects with a net present 
value above zero in appropriate ways, we'11 be on a sustainable development path. 
2) Provided that we value all the functions of environmental resources correct-
ly_, a project with a negative net present value will always violate the 
sustainable development condition. 
3) In order to fulfil the sustainable development constraint, one should manage 
the portfolio of development projects in such a way that the net benefits in 
each period are at least equal to that of the period before. It may be necess-
ary to include Zero Present Value projects to do this. 
Writing BEt and B01 for the environmental and other benefits accruing from all 
projects in period t, CE>t and C0,, for the environmental and other costs from all 
projects, 5' for the discount factor, Th for the time period over which net present 
value must be non-decreasing for weak sustainability, P for the period under 
consideration in weak sustainability, measured in Th, and T for the time horizon, 
which must be very large, this may be summarized in the following rules for 
selecting sustainable projects24: 
Select projects, including Zero Present Value projects, with: 
NPV = g / (BE,t + B0,t - CE,t - C0jt) > 0 (10) 
under the constraint: 
a) (BE>t + B0>t - CE>t - C0>t) < (BE,t+1 + B0jt+1 - CE,t+1 - C0,t+1) , all t (11a) 
24
 Compare this to the rules suggested by Pearce et al. [1990] p. 62, in which net present value is 
maximized, subject to ever increasing environmental benefits (in the strong sustainability case): Our 
set differs in guaranteeing improvement in welfare over time (which the rules of Pearce et al. do not), 
and in allowing substitution of other forms of capital for environmental capital. 
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(strong sustainability), or 
b) NPV^p < NPV^p+j, all P (11b) 
(weak sustainablility) 
Because of the requirement of satisfying (11a) or (11b) we may be forced to include 
Zero Present Value projects. It may seem that we silently assume that an infinite 
number of Zero Present Value projects exists; however, observe that we can time 
the starting of projects so as to compensate the costs of one project with the benefits 
of another. Therefore, we need only a limited number of Zero Present Value 
Projects. 
V Conclusion and some Caveats 
In this article we first defined sustainable development as a situation of ever 
increasing per capita welfare. Subsequently, we found a criterion for post hoc 
deciding whether sustainable development has been achieved or not: 
Sustainable development has not been achieved when the Green income 
measured at the prices of a year bef ore is lower than the Green income of 
the year before, assuming full use of potential production capacity at both 
years. 
We are able to lay down some rules for sustainable development project selecting. 
For small, short-lived projects we are able to lay down the following rule: If we 
start from a point, compatible with sustainable development, and the changes in 
quantities are valued according to the marginal values in the point of departure, the 
project is in line with strong sustainable development when the net benefits are 
increasing each period. In all other cases the process becomes much more compli-
cated: First we would have to calculate the closest sustainable development path, and 
then we could use marginal values of each period in our analysis to calculate costs 
and benefits. 
Next, we extended our analysis to Cost Benefit analysis. We established that only 
projects with positive net values could be in accordance with sustainable develop-
ment. To fulfil the sustainable development criterion, however, in general Zero 
Present Value Projects should be included. Formally, we obtain the following rules: 
Select projects, including Zero Present Value projects, with: 
NPV = Ij (BE>t + B0>t - CE,t - Co,,) > 0 (10) 
under the constraint: 
a) (BE>t + B0>t - CE>t - C0>t) < (BE>t+1 + B0,t+1 - CE>t+1 - CQ,t+1) , all t (11a) 
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(strong sustainability), or 
b) NPV^p < NPVTh>P+1, all P (11b) 
(weak sustainablility) 
The conclusions above are based on some very strong assumptions, which we want 
to state explicitly: 
- All functions of the environment should be included in the preference function. 
Furthermore, all consequences should be made explicit in case of establishing 
preferences with questionnaires (e.g. in case of C02 emission: it is unlikely that 
individual preferences will contain the amount of C02 in the atmosphere. Individual 
utility will react indirectly to the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, because of the 
effects it causes.). Obviously, we would require an immense amount of knowledge. 
- In the analysis it is assumed that prices reflect marginal values, e.g. that complete 
knowledge of all traded goods and services exists, and that marginal values of non-
marketables can be established. 
- Because the two conditions above are not likely to be satisfied in even close 
approximation in the near future, we would suggest using replacement values for the 
cost of destruction of natural capital. 
- A last point is the evaluation of technical progress. Technical progress results in a 
shift in the production possibility curve, which results in a higher sustainable 
production level. So far, all is easy. However, how much future progress may we 
expect? My suggestion is that the only form of technical progress which may be 
included in planning for sustainable development is the set of inventions already 
made and found viable, but not already completely diffused. 
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